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Peacekeeping,l965:
The Canadian Military's Viewpoint
David A. Lenarcic

P

eacekeeping has become a growth industry
over the last few years, both in terms of the
proliferation of missions and the numerous
academic analyses of them. However, the
historical context in which contemporary
developments are unfolding is often lost in the
shuffle. This certainly seems to be true in Canada,
where the past apparently holds little relevance
for the present when it comes to peacekeeping.
The seminal changes that have accompanied
the emergence of the "post-Cold War" era have
led Canada to seriously re-evaluate the
peacekeeping role of the armed forces. Since
1993, two Parliamentary committee studies on
new-age peacekeeping. a defence policy White
Paper, and a government report on a United
Nations rapid reaction force have appeared.
Yet, one would be hard-pressed to find in
media and even scholarly accounts of these events
any reference to the fact that thirty years ago the
Canadian government was engaged in a very
similar process of re-examination. An explosive
expansion of peacekeeping activities, coupled with
dissatisfaction with the UN's ad-hoc approach and
the inability of peacekeeping to lead to
peacemaking, acted as a catalyst for the launching
of reappraisals within the Departments of
National Defence and External Affairs.
In particular. in 1964 the Canadian
government used the occasion of hosting an
international conference in Ottawa of military
experts on the technical aspects of peacekeeping
to produce a bevy of studies on the Canadian
experience. However, these were intended for
circulation to delegates from other countries and
were thus somewhat sanitized. Papers designed
for Canadian eyes only are consequently much
more revealing. The one re-printed here falls into
that category. It provides a frank assessment
based on first-hand experience and therefore

presents a fascinating snapshot of the Canadian
military's outlook on peacekeeping during its
1960s hey-day.
The author of the report, Brigadier N.G.
Wilson-Smith, had recently commanded the
Canadian contingent in Cyprus. He had just
drafted an appraisal of UNFICYP in which he had
recommended that an extensive study of
peacekeeping and its military implications be
conducted. Some of his own views on this score
are evident in the report published here.
Canadians today - well acquainted with the
dangers of peacekeeping by half-measures in the
former Yugoslavia - will for instance have no
trouble relating to the discussion of"Arbitration"
in paragraph 9.
The Brigadier's earlier report on Cyprus also
contained one of the earliest expressions of what
has become an oft-quoted statement and in some
circles conventional wisdom. "In a situation where
men must stand between highly armed, triggerhappy fighters, a soldier's training and a strict
military discipline is needed", Wilson-Smith
wrote. "In short- this is not [a] job for a soldier
but only a soldier can do this job."
Much of the report reproduced below revolves
around this notion and the related question of
peacekeeping training. 1 This issue remains a
source of debate today and so its long historical
roots seem worth re-visiting. For example, the
February 1993 report of the Standing Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs looking into
peacekeeping noted that "The Canadian Forces
has [sic] been adamant that training as a soldier
to use force is precisely the training needed to be
a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a
soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It
is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with
soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged
and stimulated: they need training in it." In its
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June 1993 examination of peacekeeping, the
House of Commons Standing Committee on
National Defence and Veterans Affairs likewise
emphasized that "basic military training should
be supplemented by special peacekeeping training
which would enhance not only the knowledge
soldiers have of the particular characteristics of
the theatre of operations, but also the skills they
will need to carry the mission through [such as]
training in conflict resolution, mediation and
negotiation." This sounds very much like the
argument which one Department of External
Affairs official made 30 years earlier on the
question of military indoctrination for
peacekeeping when he asserted that, "it may be
just as important and perhaps even more
important to give political and diplomatic training
to personnel who may be engaged in United
Nations field operations."
Reading Brigadier Wilson-Smith's report, one
wonders what he would think of such
recommendations or, indeed, of the recent
establishment of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian
International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Might
he judge them superfluous? Or would he
acknowledge that the radically changing face of
peacekeeping today requires new approaches?
Conversely, might those currently serving in
Canada's military nod in agreement at the
Brigadier's observations? Or would they perceive
them as outdated?
Similar questions could be asked of WilsonSmith's provocative comments in paragraph 12
regarding the connection between peacekeeping
and morale. Major-General Clive Milner of
Canada, who, ironically enough, served as UN
commander in Cyprus, offered a different opinion
to the 1993 Senate Committee:
There is nothing like the completion of a sixmonth or one-year assignment to a United
Nations mission by a Canadian officer or soldier
to raise his morale. because he feels that he has
done something for himself. for his unit, for his
uniform, for his country and for the world at
large. There is a tremendous feeling of
satisfaction when that young man or young
woman comes home and is able to say. "I helped
keep the peace. I may have helped save lives. I
helped people in distress. people who were much
worse off than I am ... "As an individual it raises
morale. Collectively as a unit it certainly does.
and therefore it contributes to the well-being of
the Canadian Forces at large.

Excerpts from a Department of National
Defence document which summarized responses
to Brigadier Wilson-Smith's report are also
included here. "In our opinion," the Assistant
Chief of the Defence Staff had indicated in a
memorandum requesting comments on it, "this
paper has been well-developed and can be quite
useful as a guide for the type of forces that could
be used in future peacekeeping operations in
which Canada may become involved." The second
document suggests a broad consensus within the
higher levels of the Canadian military that WilsonSmith's observations were generally accurate.
Paragraph 10 is particularly intriguing. What is
the motivation behind the desire of the Brigadier's
colleagues to keep his attitude toward the training
and morale aspects of peacekeeping from
becoming public knowledge? Do they wish to
disguise a certain lack of enthusiasm for the role
on the part of the armed forces?
At a time when severe funding cut-backs have
some advocating - as others did in the 1960s
when the three services were unified - that the
Canadian Armed Forces should specialize in
peacekeeping, these historical documents provide
much food for thought. At the very least, they
suggest that old peacekeeping debates neither die
nor fade away.
Notes
l.

The Canadian Army Annual Training Directive for 1964 I
65 listed "to train designated individuals and units to
carry out...limited warfare including peacekeeping
operations and security-type operations" as one of the
aims of training in Canada. Such units received two to
six months of specialist training prior to deployment.
One major peacekeeping exercise was conducted
annually. In addition. a week long orientation course
was held each year for officers selected for UN service.
Briefing and debriefing of personnel on UN duty was
also regularly carried out. Although the subject of
peacekeeping was included to some extent in courses at
Canadian military schools. there were no special training
schools in Canada for peacekeeping. ("Peacel<:eeping
Operations Questionnaire: Visit of USN Officer- Capt.
C.B. Landes, USN.·· 15 Aprill965. NAC RG 24 Accession
83-84/167 Box 7162. File 2.5080.3 Part 3.)

Dr. David Lenarcic is a Faculty Associate with
the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and
Disarmament Studies. He is currently
working on a manuscript dealing with
peacekeeping in the 1950s and 1960s.

106

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol5/iss1/15

2

Lenarcic: Peacekeeping, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL
Headquarters
3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group
Carleton Barracks
Camp Gagetown
OROMOCTO, N.B.
June 1965
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

AIM
1. To outline the strength levels and types of troops required for peacekeeping operations.
GENERAL
2.

There are three levels of peacekeeping operations:
a.
Observation, which is examination without participation.
b.
Mediation. which involves intervening with the purpose of reconciliation.
c.
Arbitration, which requires the application of judgement to settle a dispute, with the
judge in full control.

OBSERVATION
3.

Observation requires officers with sufficient military experience to recognize what is a significant
tactical event. and to identify clearly military weapons and effects. They must be of sufficient rank
to provide this experience, and also to ensure themselves freedom of movement and access to the
senior officers of both sides of the dispute. This normally requires that these officers be of the rank
of major. though in some cases captains could be employed.

4.

The numbers required are dependent on the scale of the conflict and the distances involved. Normally
however, given good communications and good mobility, it is possible for a relatively small number
of officers to cover a wide area of operations.

MEDIATION
5.

Unlike observation. mediation requires active participation with both sides in the dispute. Mediators
must listen to the claims of both sides and present them to the opposing sides, and then attempt
to arrange agreement by negotiation. Before mediation can commence there must be an agreed
cease-fire. Troops must be interposed to supervise the cease-fire and observe and assess
responsibility if it is broken.

6.

In an active controversy neither side can be expected to present the truth when making their
claims. Mediation. therefore, requires independent information. This requires the interposed forces
in the area of engagement, and further forces in depth, all with sufficient training and equipment
that they can exercise close observation over both sides.

7. The task of interposing and observation can be done by well trained soldiers, with the mediation
being done by officers. A mediation force therefore requires trained and disciplined soldiers, a
command structure and an attendant staff and liaison, communications, and logistic support.
Reconnaissance elements with suitable equipment are required for surveillance in depth. Weapon
establishment can be restricted to those weapons necessary for self-defence and the defence of the
unit should one or other, or both, of the warring parties turn on the peacekeeping force. Reserves
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are not required for the operation, though some reserves would be required to rotate troops for rest
and recreation.
8.

It is difficult to arrive at a scale of strength required for mediation. as needs are dependent on

topography, distances and strength of the opposing parties. For example, more men are required
in built-up area than in open ground.
ARBITRATION
9.

Arbitration requires more direct participation by the peacekeeping force. It is necessary to judge
conflicts, and therefore, even better intelligence is required. There must also be sufficient troops
and weapon strength available to convince the conflicting sides that the peacekeepers are in fact in
control. Arbitration therefore requires the same strength as mediation, plus the addition of reserves
equipped with heavier weapons and equipment. The reserves must be of sufficient strength and
mobility so that a strong peacekeeping force can be assembled locally which would be stronger
than either of the opposing sides. As a rough guide, these reserves must be equal to one-third of
the troops employed in interposing duties, and their equipment must give them mobility, strength
and an impressive appearance.

QUALITATIVE REQUIREMENTS
10. In all forms of peacekeeping the requirement therefore is for officers and men who thoroughly
understand war. They must have the respect and confidence of both sides in a dispute, and they
will earn this respect principally from their soldierly bearing. discipline. equipment and their
reputation as fighting men. In an atmosphere of violence and fighting, the only thing which earns
respect is soldierly qualities. A peacekeeping force moreover must also be capable of sustaining
itself administratively, and of living hard if necessary; they must be able to fight in their own
defence and so must be able to operate as a complete unit.
11. It is also clear, therefore, that the peacekeeping requirement can best be met by units fully trained
for war. Training for war produces the knowledge, technical skills, command and staff procedures,
reconnaissance and intelligence techniques, logistic support systems, and the disciplines needed
for peacekeeping. In point of fact, actual peacekeeping duties use possibly only one-third of the
accumulated knowledge and experience of trained soldiers, but the other two-thirds of war training
is needed to produce the confident, self-contained, flexible and resourceful officers and men that
the role requires. It follows that a unit well trained for war is also trained for peacekeeping.
12. The suggestion that is often advanced that we should organize and train specialist units for
peacekeeping is therefore unsound. Training for peacekeeping would be taken directly from training
for war. No subject can be found which could be put on a syllabus of training for peacekeeping that
is not already covered in the present syllabus for training for war. apart possibly from a general
orientation on UN peacekeeping or on the proposed theatre of operations. Pure peacekeeping training
moreover, would suffer from the absence of the drive, urgency and sense of purpose that can be
instilled into men who are being trained for war. Peacekeeping is really pretty dreary pallid stuff; it
does not stir men or develop a unit spirit. Further, the amount of training needed for peacekeeping
would not fully extend men and would include boring repetition.
13. Moreover, the peacekeeping role does not require a special organization different from normal unit
establishments. If we established a special peacekeeping force from first principles, the result
would be units, HQ, signals, etc, looking very much like those we now have.
14. The present system, therefore, is correct and indeed has proved itself. Units should train for war
and be earmarked for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping as a subject might be studied at staff colleges
and the National Defence College, but should not form part of a soldier's training. Exercises of a
peacekeeping nature, or with a UN background, would be useful but only to provide variety and to
orient thinking on the subject.
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CONFIDENTIAL
6 August 1965
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1.

A number of interesting and related comments have been received as the result of Brig WilsonSmith's paper which should be of general interest to those staffs concerned with peacekeeping
operations ....

3.

Para 2 -The size and type of a force required for a peacekeeping mission is determined as much by
the kind of situation into which it is to be inserted as by the kind of activity in which it is to be
engaged. Therefore, it is doubtful that the three levels or categories of peacekeeping operations
mentioned adequately describe past and future operations. For example, a major peacekeeping
role may be supervision of a truce ... or an agreement...and ... such supervisory operations may or
may not involve all of the three levels described in the paper.

4.

Para 3 -In an atmosphere of violence the one characteristic which earns the respect of the opposing
sides is the soldierly qualities displayed by the officers and men of the peacekeeping force. There
are many other factors which have to be taken into account as well when selecting suitable personnel
for those tasks, particularly the officers who will be in personal contact with representatives of the
opposing sides. The following are but a few of which have to be considered:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

8.

Para 10- The only stated logistic qualitative requirement is contained in this paragraph, i.e., "A
peacekeeping force, moreover, must also be capable of sustaining itself administratively and of
living hard if necessary." Experience to date has shown that, while certain special arrangements
have had to be made to fit the logistic needs of particular forces:
a.
b.

9.

Rank:
Medical category:
Personal characteristics:
Experience: and
In some locations, ethnic origin and religion ....

There has been no real difficulty in planning the logistic support of Canadian forces to detailed
for peacekeeping operations: and
No special training has been required by any of the logistic personnel detailed for duty with
peacekeeping forces.

Para 11 - While it is true to say that fully trained regular soldiers make the best peacekeeping
forces for countries such as Canada, which have a long tradition of democracy and of respect by
the military for the civil power, it is doubtful that this is true of all countries and all traditions. The
value of troops, fully trained for war, as peacekeeping forces is likely to depend on the orientation
of military training within the society from which they are drawn, and therefore we should exercise
caution about generalizing on our own experience in this regard.

10. Para 12- penultimate sentence- It is suggested that the thought expressed here should never be
publicly stated or implied. The importance of peacekeeping in our national policy should not be
downgraded in any way by statements which, even inadvertently, suggest an impatience with the
peacekeeping role of the Force.
ll. There was complete support for the main conclusion of the paper, "It follows that a unit (Canadian)
well trained for war is also trained for peacekeeping."
[signed]
F. W. Ball, Air Vice Marshal
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
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